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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, j 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , i 
- V - \ 
PHILLIP G. SNYDER, j 
De fendant -Appe l lan t , s 
: Case No. 20470 
i P r i o r i t y No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JCTAIfl3ENl_QILTHE CASE 
Defendant, P h i l l i p G. Snyder, was charged with nine 
counts of t h e f t , a second degree fe lony, in v i o l a t i o n of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1953) , as amended. 
Defendant was convicted of e ight of the nine counts of 
t h e f t , in a jury t r i a l held September 17, 18, 19 , 20 , and 24, 
1984, in the Fourth Judic ia l D i s t r i c t Court, in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable George E. B a l l i f , Judge, 
pres iding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge B a l l i f on October 
26, 1984, to one to f i f t e e n years in the Utah State Prison on 
each of the eight counts upon which he was convicted, sentences 
to run concurrently. A f ine of $1,000.00 was imposed on each 
count and defendant was ordered to pay r e s t i t u t i o n in an amount 
not t o exceed $500,000.00, to be determined e i ther c i v i l l y or 
upon agreement with the Adult Probation and Parole Department. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The present case arises out of a series of real estate 
investment transactions beginning in July, 1979 where defendant 
received approximately $566,600.00 from various pr ivate 
i n v e s t o r s , expended the e n t i r e amount for h i s own purposes, and 
f a i l e d t o return any money. On July 23 , 1979 f defendant and 
Sunwest II Development Corporation entered in to an "Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase" agreement t o j o i n t l y purchase from 
Martensen Real Estate a certa in parcel of real property known as 
the Temple H i l l s Property in Provo, Utah (R. 117) • The agreed 
purchase price was $463,600.00 with $2,500 down, $135,000 due on 
or before July 3 1 , 1979, and the remaining balance t o be paid on 
or before January 10 , 1980, with i n t e r e s t a t two percent above 
the prime rate (R. 597) . 
In order to ra i se capi ta l to complete the property 
purchase, defendant e n l i s t e d the s e r v i c e s of Mr. Rod Bulloch, a 
real e s t a t e s a l e s agent, and began t o p r e - s e l l condominium uni t s 
which defendant planned to build on the property (R. 328-9 ) . As 
an incent ive t o inves t in defendant's proposed projec t , defendant 
offered a "double discount" or "double credi t" in which defendant 
promised t o match, do l lar for d o l l a r , an i n v e s t o r ' s down payment 
towards the purchase of or investment in to a condominium uni t , up 
t o $22,200 (R. 3 3 2 - 3 ) . The s e l l i n g p r i c e s of the condominiums 
were s e t at $65 ,000.00 , $75,000.00, and $90,000.00 (R. 332) . 
As an added i n c e n t i v e , defendant offered the 
investor/purchaser the option of e i ther occupying the condominium 
unit or allowing defendant t o r e - s e l l the unit with a guarantee 
t o the investor of double h i s investment back (R. 354, 373, 392, 
408, 409, 429, 496, 512; £&£ Also Appendix A which contains 
S t a t e ' s Exhibit 20, "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
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Purchase"). A further assurance to the invest or/purchaser was 
defendant's promise, contained in the earnest money agreement, 
that i f he defaulted, for any reason, he would return any 
investment with 10% A.P.R. i n t e r e s t . I d . 
Defendant pre-sold a to ta l of 29 condominium uni t s t o 
persons seeking t o e i ther inves t in or purchase a condominium in 
the Temple H i l l s Project (R. 256; s&£ .flJLSflr Appendix C which 
contains S t a t e ' s Exhibit 7, a l i s t of inves tors and amount 
i n v e s t e d ) . Defendant represented t o the inves tors that the offer 
was l imi ted t o about 12 investors (R. 353, 375, 408, 409, 430, 
513) , that the funds would be used exc lus ive ly for e i ther the 
purchase of the ground or as up-front money to begin construction 
(R. 350, 409, 433, 496, 513, 1292) , and that the ir money was t o 
be used only for the Temple H i l l s Project (R. 353, 366, 375, 376, 
385, 3 92, 513) . He a l so represented that the ir money would be 
held in trust unt i l there were s u f f i c i e n t funds to pay off the 
land (R. 353, 393, 394, 430, 436, 437, 460, 498 ) . Once the land 
was paid off, defendant to ld inves tors that they would have the 
land as secur i ty for the ir investment (R. 369, 384, 386, 400, 
401, 466) . He to ld inves tors that there was "no risk" (R. 391, 
404) , and that they could get the ir money back i f they desired 
(R. 399, 412, 414, 430, 433, 513) . Defendant represented his 
personal net worth to be about 4 mi l l i on do l lars and that he 
could wri te a refund check t o the investor a t anytime (R. 412, 
1289) . 
Defendant did not d i s c l o s e to the investors that he 
intended to use the ir money for projects other than Temple H i l l s 
- 3 -
(R. 353, 375, 393, 411 , 432, 447, 5 1 5 ) . Neither did the 
inves tors authorize defendant to use the ir money for purposes 
unrelated t o the Temple H i l l s project (R. 411, 499, 5 1 6 ) . 
Defendant, however, t e s t i f i e d that he never intended t o , or 
represented that he would, deposit the inves tors 1 moneys in a 
t r u s t account or use i t s o l e l y for the Temple H i l l s Project (R. 
959, 978, 1006) . He maintained that a non-refundabil i ty clause 
in the earnest money agreement allowed him to use the money 
f r e e l y (R. 959, 978, 1006) . 
Prior to s e l l i n g the condominiums, defendant, along 
with h i s then-partner, Mike Crocket t , ! prepared an Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter referred t o as 
"Earnest Money Agreement") which was l a t e r used as the bas ic form 
of agreement between defendant and the inves tors (R. 315, 953; 
See Appendix A). The Earnest Money Agreement contained two 
c lauses added by defendant re la t ing t o re fundabi l i ty (R. 958 ) . 
Clause 1 on l i n e 16 of the Earnest Money Agreement s tated that 
the "Buyer understands and agrees that t h i s earnest money deposi t 
i s non-refundable." (See, Appendix A). Clause 10 between l i n e s 
53 and 54 s tated that "In the event that the s e l l e r d e f a u l t s , for 
any reason, and the project cannot be completed, a l l moneys 
previously deposited by Buyer w i l l be returned in f u l l , plus 10% 
annual i n t e r e s t . " IJ3 . When asked by inves tors why Clause 1 
1 Mike Crockett was a co-owner, along with Harold Paulos, in 
Sunwest II Development Corporation, which corporation was a 
partner with defendant in the Temple H i l l s Condominium Project . 
Defendant bought out Sunwest I I 1 s i n t e r e s t in the f a l l of 1979 
(R. 260, 759) . 
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proh ib i t s refundabil i ty and Clause 10 expressly provides for i t f 
defendant responded tha t i t was j u s t a t echn ica l i ty , tha t his 
lawyer required i t to be there , tha t i t was nothing t o worry 
about, and that Clause 10, the refundabil i ty clause, in effect 
n u l l i f i e s Clause 1, the non-ref undabl i l i ty clause (R. 355, 408, 
518). Defendant explained a t t r i a l tha t the non-refundabili ty 
clause was included in the Earnest Money Agreement because he 
believed tha t i t permitted him to use the i n v e s t o r ' s money for 
any purpose he desired (R. 958-9) • 
Upon receiving the i n v e s t o r ' s money, defendant did not 
place t h e i r money in t r u s t , but rather deposited i t in h is own 
business account over which defendant had sole control (R. 118, 
119). The moneys were commingled with funds unrelated to the 
Temple Hi l l s Project and two witnesses from the Department of 
Business Regulations t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l tha t defendant viola ted 
Sta te law by not immediately placing the inves to rs ' money in a 
t r u s t account (R. 236, 245, 833-4). Shelly Wismer, lead 
inves t iga tor for the Department of Business Regulations, 
t e s t i f i e d tha t defendant entered in to a s t i pu la t ion with the Real 
Estate Commission tha t he had v io la ted the t r u s t account rule and 
tha t h i s real e s t a t e broker ' s l icense was suspended for 9 months 
and placed on probation for 12 months thereaf ter (R. 1074, 1081). 
The Sta te cal led several witnesses to es tab l i sh 
defendant 's in tent to exercise unauthorized control over the 
inves to r s ' moneys. Michael Crockett t e s t i f i e d tha t he may have 
suggested to defendant tha t he include the non-refundabili ty 
clause in the Earn* s t Money Agreement to provide greater 
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f l e x i b i l i t y in dispensing funds (R. 300, 301 , 315 ) . However, Mr. 
Crockett s ta ted that he did not be l i eve that the non-
refundabi l i ty c lause gave defendant the r ight t o use the 
inves tors 1 money on projec ts other than Temple H i l l s and that he 
was not aware that defendant was doing so (R. 278, 293, 2 9 5 ) . 
Rod Bulloch, the e x c l u s i v e real e s t a t e l i s t i n g agent 
for the Temple H i l l s Project , t e s t i f i e d that defendant had 
represented to both he and the inves tors that the money would be 
held in a t rus t account unt i l there was enough money t o pay for 
the land (R. 328, 340) . He a lso s tated that he be l ieved 
defendant had deposited the money in a trus t account and that he 
was not aware of any moneys being used by defendant for projec ts 
other than Temple H i l l s (R. 341 ) . 
Several of the inves tors in the Temple H i l l s Project 
t e s t i f i e d about defendant's representat ions t o them at the time 
of t h e i r investment. David G. Smith s tated that he had invested 
approximately $40,000.00 towards the purchase of condominiums in 
the Temple H i l l s Project (R. 1285) . Mr. Smith s tated that 
defendant had approached him at church and said he was o f fer ing 
an investment opportunity to small inves tors and that he needed 
some up-front money for the project (R. 1286-1288) . Defendant 
l a t e r met with Mr. Smith in Smith1s home, explained the Temple 
H i l l s Project , and t o l d Mr. Smith that the project was both 
v i a b l e and imminent (R. 1288) . Defendant then produced an 
Earnest Money Agreement and proceeded t o expla in , l i n e by l i n e , 
each item contained therein (R. 1289) . 
- 6 -
When asked about the non-refundabil ity c lause , 
defendant t o l d Mr. Smith not t o worry because Clause 10 
guaranteed the money would be returned (R. 1289) . Defendant 
explained, however, that the money would not be immediately 
refundable because i t would be "tied up" in the project , but i f 
Mr. Smith wanted h i s money back a t any time, he would be able to 
refund i t since he had a personal f inancial statement in excess 
of $4 mi l l i on d o l l a r s . 2 Defendant t o l d Mr. Smith that he and h i s 
at torney, Clyde Sandgren, had prepared the Earnest Money 
Agreement and that Mr. Smith should f e e l comfortable with i t (R. 
1290) . Defendant represented that the offer was l imi ted t o about 
12 inves tors and that the money would be used f i r s t to pay off 
the ground and l a t e r to begin construct ion (R. 1291-2) . 
Defendant assured Mr. Smith that the money would be used only for 
the Temple H i l l s Project and that he had almost enough money to 
pay off the ground (R. 1292) . Since Mr. Smith was a l so a 
l i c e n s e d real e s ta te agent, he bel ieved that earnest money would 
be deposited in a t rus t account though defendant did not 
express ly represent t o Mr. Smith that he intended t o do so (R. 
1295, 1297, 1299) . 
As a r e s u l t of defendant's representat ions , Mr. Smith 
invested $33,000 on August 3 1 , 1979, and another $5,000 on 
November 6, 1979 (£££, Second Amended Information at R. 112-115; 
2
 Defendant l a t e r t e s t i f i e d that in 1979 he had a personal net 
worth of only about $200,000.00 and that he did not represent t o 
investors that h i s net worth was $4 mi l l i on (R. 1002) . He stated 
that i f the inves tors said hat he represented h i s net worth to 
be $4 mi l l i on d o l l a r s , then they were ly ing (R. 1003) . 
- 7 -
£££ jdJSfi, Appendix B which contains S t a t e ' s Exhibit #47, a 
schedule of depos i t s and disbursements from defendant's real 
e s t a t e operating account from August, 1979 to Apri l , 1980; and 
Appendix C)• Some 18 t o 24 months a f ter h i s investment, Mr* 
Smith approached defendant inquiring about the project and was 
to ld by defendant that the property was being forec losed upon and 
that i t would be necessary t o secure a loan on the property to 
save i t (R. 1300-1) . When Mr. Smith asked defendant where the 
i n v e s t o r ' s money had gone, why the property hadn't been paid for , 
and why defendant had already taken out a loan on the property in 
excess of the value of the property, defendant responded saying 
i t was not the place of the inves tors t o have that knowledge, 
that he was the developer, and that i t was h i s business and he 
would run i t (R. 1301). 
On May 1 3 , 1981, Mr. Smith and several other inves tors 
met with defendant in h i s o f f i c e and requested that the i r money 
be returned (R. 1303) . They a l so requested defendant t o re lease 
the names of a l l the other inves tors in the projec t . Xd. 
Defendant refused t h e i r requests (R. 1304) . 
In August of 1981, a group of i n v e s t o r s , including Mr. 
Smith, f i l e d a c i v i l act ion against defendant, and a l i s pendens 
against the property, in order to protect any i n t e r e s t they might 
have had (R. 706, 1304) . As a r e s u l t , defendant's property was 
se ized and an involuntary Chapter 11 bankruptcy ac t ion was 
i n i t i a t e d against him (R. 1304) . 
Another inves tor , Mr. Jack Yalden, who was introduced 
to defendant by Mr. Smith (R. 350) , t e s t i f i e d that he met with 
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defendant on November 6, 1979, signed an Earnest Money Agreement, 
and del ivered to defendant $7,333.33 to be invested in the Temple 
H i l l s Project (R. 349 ) . Mr. Yalden stated that defendant to ld 
him he could double h i s money in 24 months i f he invested in the 
project (R. 350) . Defendant said that the money would be used t o 
begin construct ion on the project and that bank loans would make 
up any remaining construct ion c o s t s (R. 350) . Once the 
condominiums were completed, defendant to ld Mr. Yalden that he 
could choose one, get the discount on the pr ice , and when the 
condominium was re - so ld he would get double h i s money back (R. 
351) . 
Mr. Yalden said defendant represented that he owned the 
land free and clear and that there was nothing to be concerned 
about in the investment (R. 351-52) . Defendant to ld Mr. Yalden 
that he could personally write a refund check, i f necessary, 
s ince he had a net worth of $4 mi l l i on do l lars (R. 352) . Mr. 
Yalden a l so explained that defendant represented that 
construct ion was t o begin r ight away, that the offer was l imi ted 
t o ten t o twelve i n v e s t o r s , and that the money would be held in a 
t rus t account t o be used for the project 3 (R. 353 ) . 
Mr. Yalden s tated that had defendant d i sc losed h i s 
in tent t o use the money for other pro jec t s , he would not have 
invested (R. 353) . In regards t o the non-refundabil i ty c lause , 
defendant to ld Mr. Yalden not t o worry about i t , that h i s 
3
 Defendant l a t e r t e s t i f i e d that he d idn' t mention a trus t 
account to Mr. Yalden and that he only intended to use some of 
the money for the Temple H i l l s p r o j e : t , but not a l l of i t (R. 
980, 1011) . 
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attorney required i t f and tha t Clause 10 guaranteed a fu l l refund 
plus 10% annual i n t e r e s t if a problem arose (R. 355). Mr. Yalden 
t e s t i f i e d t ha t he believed t h a t he couldn ' t lose—at worst he 
would get h i s money back plus 10% i n t e r e s t , i d . 
Heber C. Pace, Mr. Smith's fa ther- in- law, t e s t i f i e d 
tha t he too met with defendant on August 3 1 , 1979, and delivered 
to defendant $11,000 to be invested in the Temple H i l l s Project 
(R. 372). Mr. Pace described the same representa t ions from 
defendant t h a t Mr. Smith and Mr. Yalden t e s t i f i e d t o , namely; the 
double the money back guarantee, the investment return plus 10% 
i n t e r e s t upon s e l l e r ' s defaul t , the l imi ted number of inves tors , 
the money to be used exclusively for the pro jec t , the 
construct ion beginning r i gh t away, the land was already paid for , 
and tha t the investment was secured by the land (R. 373-76, 384-
86) . However, Mr. Pace said defendant did not represent t o him 
how the money was to be held or tha t he intended t o invest i t in 
other pro jec ts (R. 377) . Like the other inves tors , Mr. Pace said 
tha t he would not have invested had defendant disclosed his 
in ten t t o speculate with the money (R. 376) • 
Joel Barlow t e s t i f i e d tha t he met with defendant and 
other inves tors on about September 4 , 1979 (R. 390). He said 
tha t he and h is wife were very concerned about making a bad 
investment and tha t they were assured by defendant t h a t there was 
•absolutely no way" they could lose t he i r money (R. 391) . 4 
* Defendant t e s t i f i e d t ha t he explained t o the Barlows t ha t un t i l 
he got a deed, the r isk in the investment was very, very high (R. 
987). He also said t h a t he told them not to invest i f they had 
any fea r . XdL 
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Defendant offered Mr. Barlow the double discount and said he 
would put the money in to escrow or a t rus t fund unt i l he got a l l 
the money he needed t o pay for the land 5 (R. 392-94) . Defendant 
t o l d Mr. Barlow that the land was securi ty for the investment and 
that another contract would be forthcoming t o replace the Earnest 
Money Agreement and that i t would describe the land as a securi ty 
(R. 4 0 0 ) . Mr. Barlow t e s t i f i e d that a new contract was never 
made. i d . He s tated that he del ivered $22,000.00 to defendant 
on September 4 , 1979 to be invested in the Temple H i l l s Project 
and that h i s money was never returned (R. 391) . 
The f ina l investor named in the information t o t e s t i f y 
was Arben J o l l e y (R. 406) . Mr. J o l l e y t e s t i f i e d that he invested 
$30,000.00 in the Temple H i l l s Project , upon the representat ions 
of defendant, and that none of h i s money had been returned (R. 
4 0 7 ) . Defendant to ld Mr. Jo l l ey and h i s wife that the project 
was going right ahead, that he needed up-front money to get 
construct ion s tar ted , that there were a l imi ted number of 
inves tors and that they would get double the ir money back (R. 
408) . Defendant further explained t o Mr. and Mrs. Jo l l ey that 
the non-refundabil i ty c lause was j u s t a t e c h n i c a l i t y required by 
h i s lawyer and that Clause #10 assured that the money would be 
returned. Xd. Mr. J o l l e y s tated that defendant did not d i s c l o s e 
the in ten t ion t o use the money for speculat ion purposes and that 
i f i t had been d i s c l o s e d , he would not have invested (R. 411) . 
5
 Defendant t e s t i f i e d that he d idn' t mention a t rust account t o 
the Barlows and that they must have heard i t from one of the 
other inves tors (R. 987) . 
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Mr. Jol ley also said t h a t he did not authorize defendant t o use 
the money for anything other than Temple H i l l s . JLd. 
Mr. Jol ley maintained t h a t defendant represented h i s 
net worth to be 4 mil l ion do l l a r s and tha t Mr. Jo l ley could get 
h i s money back a t any time with 10% annual i n t e r e s t (R. 412). 
He said that defendant did not explain how the money was to be 
held, but he believed the money was placed in t r u s t with Stewart 
T i t l e Company, the t i t l e company named on the Earnest Money 
Agreement (R. 413, 415; See a l so , Appendix A). 
Three other investors not named in the Second Amended 
Information t e s t i f i e d about the representa t ions made by defendant 
in the i r presence. 6 One such inves tor , Martha Browning, was 
present when the Barlows were introduced to the project and sold 
by defendant (R. 434). Mrs. Browning t e s t i f i e d that defendant 
represented t o herself and others t ha t the offer was l imi ted to 
10-12 inves to r s , that she would get double c red i t towards the 
purchase of a condominium, tha t the money was needed t o pay for 
the land, tha t the money would be held in a t r u s t account, and 
tha t if the project fa i l ed she would get her money back plus 10% 
annual i n t e r e s t (R. 429-30, 436, 437). Mrs. Browning also 
t e s t i f i e d t ha t defendant had to ld her he had a s s e t s worth 4 
mil l ion do l l a r s and tha t he had invested in a gold mine tha t 
would eventually pay for the project (R. 436, 440). She said 
tha t defendant to ld her tha t if "worse came to worse," the 
6
 Martha Browning, Norman Carlson, and Sara Yates were permitted 
to t e s t i f y but were l imi ted in the i r testimony to avoid prejudice 
to the defendant of evidence of other crimes not charged in the 
information (R. 483-92). 
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inves tors would have the ground as securi ty s ince the ground 
would be paid for (R. 466) . 
Norman Carlson and Sara Yates the two other inves tors 
not named in the information, t e s t i f i e d that defendant had 
represented t o them that the ir money would be held in t rus t 
and/or used s o l e l y for the purchase of the Temple H i l l s Project 
ground (R. 496-8 , 5 1 3 ) . 
The State then ca l l ed several wi tnesses who had 
received moneys from defendant from the bank account containing 
the Temple H i l l s Project funds. Jay Peterson, a real e s t a t e 
broker, t e s t i f i e d that on December 4 , 1979, defendant purchased 
Jay Peterson Realty for $183,150.00 with $53,000.00 down and the 
re s t on contract (R. 537, 545, 547) . Mr, Peterson said he was 
unaware that defendant bought the rea l ty company with Temple 
H i l l s Project funds (R. 547; Appendix B). Defendant subsequently 
defaulted on the contract and l o s t ownership of the rea l ty 
company (R. 548-9, 551) . 
Dr. I l i f f C. Jeffrey t e s t i f i e d that defendant purchased 
a home from him for $150,000.00 in June of 1979 (R. 554) . Dr. 
Jef frey said the down payment was $50,000.00 which was spread 
over a period of about 9 months and ended in April of 19 80 (R. 
5 5 4 - 5 ) . Defendant did not d i s c l o s e t o Dr. Jeffrey that the money 
was obtained from inves tors in the Temple H i l l s Condominium 
Project (R. 555; Appendix B ) . 
Stanley Bronson t e s t i f i e d that defendant had invested 
$15,000 in to a shopping mall venture in Blanding, Utah in October 
of 1979 (R. 560, 561; Appe-idix B) . In return, defendant was 
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given a one-third partnership in the shopping mall project by 
oral agreement (R. 562-3) . No secur i ty was given for defendant's 
investment and the shopping mall project f a i l e d . I d . While 
defendant requested that h i s money be returned, Mr. Bronson 
s ta ted that i t had already been obl igated and could not be 
returned (R. 566) . 
Jack Stockwell t e s t i f i e d that defendant invested a 
subs tant ia l sum of money in a mining venture c a l l e d West American 
Mining (R. 5 7 5 - 6 ) . Defendant made periodic payments toward the 
mining venture and in return received a one-fourth i n t e r e s t in 
the venture (R. 575-7; Appendix B ) . No wr i t t en agreement was 
ever signed and defendant only acquired a property i n t e r e s t in 
the venture ' s mining equipment (R. 575, 591 , 594 ) . Mr. Stockwell 
t e s t i f i e d that according t o the assay reports performed on the 
mining claim property, the projected recoverable gold value was 
in the hundreds of m i l l i o n s of do l lars (R. 581) . The project 
f a i l e d , however, when i t was discovered that there was no gold on 
the property and that the man who had represented that there was 
gold had "salted" or sprinkled gold p a r t i c l e s on the spot where 
the assay samples had been taken (R. 585) . Mr. Stockwell s tated 
that he was unaware of the source of defendant's investment 
moneys and that none had been returned to defendant (R. 576). 
Elden Martenson, owner of Martenson Real Estate , 
t e s t i f i e d that he received the f u l l down payment of $131,127.60 
on the Temple H i l l s property from defendant on August 3 1 , 1979 
(R. 599; Appendix B). The balance of the purchase price was 
handled on a trust deed note due on January 10 , 1980 (R. 599 ) . 
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On November 19 , 1980, defendant paid $300,000.00 towards the 
$328,600.00 remaining balance on the property and offered a 
condominium unit in l i e u of the s h o r t f a l l in principal and 
i n t e r e s t payments (R. 599) . Mr. Martenson accepted the promised 
condominium unit and secured i t with a trus t deed note for the 
amount of $85,688.62 (R. 602) . He further t e s t i f i e d that at the 
time he sold the Temple H i l l s property to defendant, the City had 
approved the development plans presented t o them (R. 611)• He 
explained that since defendant changed the construct ion plans 
which had already been approved by the City , i t became necessary 
for defendant t o get new approval (R. 612 ) . 
John Fisher t e s t i f i e d that defendant invested $50,000 
into a company ca l l ed Sage I n s t i t u t e in about February of 1980 
(R. 622-3; JSJ££, Appendix B). In June or July of 1980, defendant 
demanded the return of h i s investment and thereafter received h i s 
money back in f u l l plus i n t e r e s t in insta l lments (R. 622-4) . 
Jerald B. F e l i x , a commercial loan o f f i cer for F.M.A. 
Thrift and Loan, t e s t i f i e d that defendant obtained a loan from 
F.M.A. on November 1 1 , 1980, in the amount of $400,000.00 to be 
used to clear the t i t l e on the Temple H i l l s property (R. 626-
635) . Mr. Fel ix s tated that the property was valued a t 
$833,000.00 but that defendant represented the t o t a l purchase 
price of the property to be much l e s s (R. 631) . Defendant a l s o 
represented to Mr. Fe l ix that he had already spent $150,000.00 of 
h i s own money on the property from defendant's own real e s t a t e 
operation (R. 633; See Appendix B). However, defendant did not 
d i s c l o s e that other persons had invested money towards the Temple 
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H i l l s Project (R. 6 3 3 ) . Mr. Fe l ix explained that had defendant 
d i s c lo sed the $566 f000.00 he had received from the i n v e s t o r s , 
F.M.A. would not have made the loan (R. 6 3 5 ) . He said that a f ter 
t i t l e had been cleared of a l l l i e n s , $56,000.00 remained from the 
$400,000.00 loan t o be used for engineering and design (R. 638-
9 ) . The terms of the loan required quarterly i n t e r e s t payments 
with a bal loon payment in one year for the principal amount (R. 
640-1 ) . While defendant paid the f i r s t quarterly i n t e r e s t 
payment of $21,910.92 on March 2 , 1981, he defaulted on the other 
quarterly i n t e r e s t payments and F.M.A. began forec losure 
proceedings on October 8, 1981. 
Jimmy Rae Boswel l , senior v i ce -pres ident a t C i t i z e n ' s 
Bank in Ogden, t e s t i f i e d that he had met with defendant on 
several occasions t o d i scuss a poss ib le construct ion loan for the 
Temple H i l l s Project (R. 674-676, 1052) . Mr. Boswell s ta ted that 
he f i r s t began negot ia t ions with defendant in the spring of 1981 
and issued a commitment l e t t e r to defendant for $896,700.00 to 
begin Phase I of the Temple H i l l s Project upon several condi t ions 
(R. 676, 697-8 , 702) . A second commitment l e t t e r was issued on 
February 2 , 1982 for $4,283,800.00 with further condi t ions t o be 
met by defendant before C i t i z e n ' s would loan the e n t i r e amount 
needed t o complete construct ion (R. 677, 6 9 9 ) . Mr. Boswell 
t e s t i f i e d that defendant f a i l e d to s a t i s f y any of the condit ions 
in the second commitment l e t t e r and only a few of the condit ions 
contained i n the f i r s t commitment l e t t e r (R. 683, 7 82) . 
S p e c i f i c a l l y , Mr. Boswell s tated that defendant f a i l e d t o meet 
the condit ions in the f i r s t commitment l e t t e r requiring defendant 
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t o ; (1) p r e - s e l l a s p e c i f i c number of condominium uni t s t o 
•qua l i f i ed buyers", (2) show proof of City approval, (3) clear 
a l l l i e n s on property, and (4) furnish a performance bond or l i f e 
insurance po l i cy (R. 703) . 
Stephen Roth, an attorney who had represented several 
inves tors in the Temple H i l l s Projec t s , t e s t i f i e d that he had 
f i l e d s u i t on behalf of h i s c l i e n t s against defendant and placed 
a l i s pendens on the Temple H i l l s property in August of 1981 (R. 
706 ) . Mr. Roth t e s t i f i e d that he negotiated with d e f e n d a n t s 
attorney and agreed t o remove the l i s pendens upon four 
condi t ions : (1) that defendant obtain a construct ion loan for 
the project ; (2) that defendant reduce the l i e n on the property 
by making a payment t o F.M.A. Thrift in the amount of 
$175,000.00; (3) that defendant dismiss a l l claims against the 
i n v e s t o r s ; and (4) that defendant transfer h i s i n t e r e s t in the 
property located on Univers i ty Street t o the inves tors in 
exchange for an o f f s e t against what he owed the investors (R. 
709-710) . Mr. Roth said that he stood ready t o remove the l i s 
pendens a t a l l times upon fu l f i l lment of the condit ions (R. 710) . 
Mr. Brent Morris, an inves t iga tor with the Utah County 
Attorney's Off ice , t e s t i f i e d that the i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the 
Temple H i l l s Project or ig inated when the County Attorney's Office 
received an anonymous l e t t e r making a l l e g a t i o n s of wrongdoing (R. 
729) . Mr. Morris met with defendant and h i s attorney on two 
occas ions and discussed the events leading t o the l o s s of the 
inves tors 1 money (R. 719-26) . He conducted an audit of 
defendant's operating accounts, prepared a summary of depos i t s 
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and disbursements (which became S t a t e ' s Exhibit #47) , and 
t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l that defendant had expended a l l of the 
i n v e s t o r ' s money by April 29 , 1980 (R. 729-40 ) . 
Cleo Hanson, a s s i s t a n t v i ce -pres ident at C i t i z e n s Bank 
in Ogden, t e s t i f i e d that defendant f a i l e d t o meet the condit ional 
prerequi s i t e s contained in e i ther of the loan commitment l e t t e r s 
(R. 1025, 1029-30) . S p e c i f i c a l l y , defendant f a i l e d t o provide t o 
the bank (1) any documentation that he had pre-sold 7 0% of the 
un i t s t o q u a l i f i e d buyers, (2) a complete s e t of plans on the 
pro jec t , (3) an ALTA pol icy showing the property free and clear 
of a l l l i e n s , (4) a l i f e insurance pol icy for the amount of the 
loan naming Ci t i zens as benef ic iary , and (5) approval of the 
project from the City of Provo (R. 1030-36) . Mrs. Hanson 
t e s t i f i e d that in her opinion the loan was never "ready to c lose" 
and that she did not represent t o defendant that i t was (R. 
1035) . The bank withdrew the loan commitment o f f er s on April 25, 
1982 (R. 1037) . 
Clyde Sandgren, defendant's l e g a l counsel in 1979, 
t e s t i f i e d that he did not prepare an earnest money agreement for 
the Temple H i l l s Project and that he had no r e c o l l e c t i o n of 
d i scuss ing a non-refundabil i ty c lause with defendant (R. 1091-2) . 
The de fense ' s case focused upon defendant's b e l i e f , 
based upon the non-refundabil i ty c lause in the Earnest Money 
Agreement that he was free to use the inves tor s ' moneys in any 
manner. Harold Michael Paulos, co-owner of Sunwest II 
Development Corporation, t e s t i f i e d that defendant paid him 
$2,000.00 a month in consul t ing f e e s for h i s work on the Temple 
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Hi l l s Project (R. 757, 759) • Mr* Paulos said t h a t he acted as 
Project Manager for the Temple Hi l l s Project with the 
r e spons ib i l i ty of obtaining City approval for the project (R. 
762-3 , 767, 781). Once City approval was obtained in February of 
1980f Mr. Paulos aided defendant in preparing the financing 
package to obtain a construct ion loan (R. 768). Mr. Paulos 
t e s t i f i e d t ha t defendant had shown him a copy of the Earnest 
Money Agreement and explained tha t the money was invested in him 
personally and could be used for any purpose he desired (R. 784). 
Defendant to ld Mr. Paulos tha t he was building his net worth by 
making investments with the money so he would be t te r qualify for 
financing (R. 785). I t was Mr. Paulos1s opinion that defendant 
had done about everything a developer could t o do to make the 
project work and tha t the rea l c u l p r i t was the economy (R. 788f 
796) . 
Chad Bauer, a real e s t a t e salesman for defendant in 
1980, t e s t i f i e d that defendant had explained to him the non-
refundabil i ty clause him and how i t simply created a non-
refundable deposit (R. 860, 867-8). When asked what h is opinion 
was concerning the non-refunabil i ty c lause, Mr. Bauer said t ha t 
he believed defendant could do anything he wanted with the 
investors 1 moneys (R. 638, 646) . 
Clark Barney Oborn, a l i f e insurance agent and long-
time friend of defendant, recal led defendant t e l l i n g him tha t the 
inves tors 1 moneys was his [defendant 's! to use a t his d i sc re t ion 
(R. 884-5) . Mr. Oborn a lso s ta ted tha t he was prepared to 
execute a l i f e insurance policy for defendant naming Cit izens 
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Bank as beneficiary in order to f u l f i l l the condit ions contained 
in the commitment l e t t e r s (R. 898). 
Final ly f defendant t e s t i f i e d in h i s own behalf tha t he 
believed he had the r ight to use the funds because of the non-
refundabi l i ty clause (R. 961). He said t h a t he and Mr. Crockett 
had come up with the idea and tha t they had expressly included 
the non-refundabil i ty clause in the earnest money agreement so 
they could use the money f ree ly (R. 953, 958-9). He explained 
tha t he never intended t o use a t r u s t account because i t would 
have r e s t r i c t e d h is freedom in using the money (R. 968-9). He 
admitted, however, t ha t the money was t o be held and not spent, 
but he maintained tha t he did not mention the use of a t r u s t 
account t o anyone7 (R. 967-8)• 
Defendant admitted t h a t he had used funds obtained from 
the inves tors for purposes other than Temple H i l l s , but explained 
tha t h i s only in tent ion in doing so was t o build h i s personal net 
worth in order to be t t e r qualify for a loan (R. 959, 961, 1012). 
He explained tha t he did not disclose h i s in ten t to use the money 
freely because the investors did not ask (R. 978). 
According to defendant, i t was h i s understanding t h a t 
the loan from Ci t izens Bank was ready to close on Tuesday, May 
23, 1982, jus t two days before the foreclosure sale (R. 944). 
Defendant believed tha t the only condition l e f t to be performed 
7
 Defendant admitted t ha t he may have used tl e word " t r u s t , " but 
not the words " t ru s t account" (R. 968). 
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was the removal of the lis pendens from the property8 (R. 944). 
Defendant said that he contacted about 300 lendersf 
either personally or through his associates, in an attempt to 
obtain financing for the project (R. 923). He claimed that 
lenders refused to consider a loan to him because of the 
escalating interest rates and depressed housing market during 
that time period (R. 926)• 
Point I. The evidence at trial was sufficient to 
establish the elements of theft; specifically, (1) that defendant 
obtained and exercised control over the investors' money (2) with 
the purpose of depriving them thereof by unauthorized and 
unrelated expenditures. The theft prosecution was not time 
barred since two of the eight counts were within the original 
statute of limitations time period and the other six were within 
an extended time period under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303 (1953), 
as amended, since the prosecution was commenced under an offense 
which contained fraud as a material element. Sufficient evidence 
was offered to establish that the prosecution was commenced 
within the statutory time periods. 
Point II. The jury verdict was proper regarding the 
statute of limitations. Although the jury could have found that 
b
 Mrs. Hanson and Mr. Boswell of Citizens Bank both testified 
that there were a number of material conditions contained in the 
commitment letters that defendant failed to meet (R. 6 83, 702, 
1030-36). 
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defendant committed the the f t on the f i r s t date a l l eged in the 
information the offense would s t i l l have been within the s t a t u t e 
of l i m i t a t i o n s under Utah Code Ann. S 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 ( 3 ) . 
Point I I I . Because defendant f a i l e d to properly and 
t imely object a t t r i a l and because defendant f a i l s t o support h i s 
arguments with any record evidence, t h i s Court should not 
consider defendant's claim that i t was error for the t r i a l court 
to proceed with a hearing on a new t r i a l motion without an 
adequate record of the t r i a l . In the a l t e r n a t i v e f i t was 
harmless error s ince there was no reasonable l i k e l i h o o d of a more 
favorable r e s u l t for the defendant, since defendant's grounds for 
a new t r i a l motion were s a t i s f a c t o r i l y presented. 
Point IV. While the t r i a l court admittedly f a i l e d t o 
s t a t e the reasons for ordering r e s t i t u t i o n as part of i t s wr i t ten 
orderr the omission was not c r i t i c a l s ince the record as a whole 
e s tab l i shed the appropriateness of r e s t i t u t i o n . The f i n e s 
imposed and r e s t i t u t i o n ordered are within the d i s c r e t i o n of the 
t r i a l court and further were within the l i m i t s prescribed by law. 
Since the amount of r e s t i t u t i o n and the means of payment have not 
yet been determined, defendant i s premature in his claimed 
i n a b i l i t y t o pay. Defendant lacks standing t o c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
chal lenge the s ta tute providing for contempt of court upon 
nonpayment of f ines or r e s t i t u t i o n . In any event, the s ta tute 
providing for imprisonment for contempt upon nonpayment of f i n e s 
or r e s t i t u t i o n i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y sound since i t provides 
safeguards aga ins t imprisonment for mere debt. 
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ARGUMENT 
PQINT-i 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF THEFT UNDER UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 7 6 - 6 - 4 0 4 AND PROSECUTION WAS 
NOT TIME BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS. 
A. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS OFFERED 
AT TRIAL TO SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S 
CONVICTIONS OF THEFT. 
The standard ar t i cu la ted by t h i s Court for reviewing a 
challenge to the suf f ic iency of evidence i s that the evidence and 
a l l reasonable inferences drawn therefrom w i l l be viewed in a 
l i g h t most favorable to the j u r y ' s verdict and t o s e t aside a 
jury verd ic t r the evidence must be " s u f f i c i e n t l y inconclusive or 
so inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime of which he was convicted." State v. Rebeterano, 681 P.2d 
1265, 1266 (Utah 1984); Stat^y^Gaisia, 663 P.2d 60 , 63 (Utah 
1983); State v. Stewart. 33 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (May 1 , 1986) . 
Moreover, i t i s the exc lus ive province of the jury t o judge the 
c r e d i b i l i t y of the wi tnesses and the weight of the evidence. 
S±a±£-y*-}lSM£ll, 649 P.2d 91 , 97 (Utah 1982). 
Defendant argues on appeal that he was wrongfully 
convicted of thef t s ince the evidence a t t r i a l revealed theft by 
deception rather than embezzlement. (j&fi Appel lant 's Brief at 
pp. 15-16) . He suggests that because he formed the intent t o 
deprive the inves tors of the ir money before rather than af ter 
obtaining control of the ir money, he should not have been found 
g u i l t y of the f t under Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1953) , as 
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amended. Defendant c l e a r l y mis interprets the the f t s ta tu te and 
the purpose for which i t was adopted. 
In 1973, the Utah Theft Statute was modified t o 
consol idate the numerous common law the f t theor i e s i n t o an a l l 
encompassing general the f t statute.** The general purpose of 
conso l idat ion was to prevent a defendant from claiming on appeal 
that he may have been g u i l t y under one part icular theory of 
t h e f t , but was not g u i l t y of the theory upon which he was charged 
and c o n v i c t e d . 1 0 The Utah Theft Statute seeks t o avoid such 
problems by providing a s ing le crime of t h e f t that may be 
e s t a b l i s h e d by proof of any one of several substant ive 
d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e f t . Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-403 (1953), as 
amended. Sect ion 403 reads as fo l l ows : 
Theft—Evidence to support accusa t ion .— 
Conduct denominated t h e f t in t h i s part 
c o n s t i t u t e s a s ing le offense embracing the 
separate of fenses such as those heretofore 
known as larceny, larceny by t r i c k , larceny 
by b a i l e e s , embezzlement, f a l s e pretense , 
e x t o r t i o n , blackmail, rece iv ing s t o l e n 
property. An accusat ion of the f t may be 
supported by evidence that i t was committed 
in any manner spec i f i ed in s e c t i o n s 76-6-404 
through 76-6-410, subject to the power of the 
court to ensure a f a i r t r i a l by granting a 
continuance or other appropriate r e l i e f where 
the conduct of the defense would be prejudiced 
by lack of fa i r not ice or by surpr i se . 
9 The Utah Theft Statute general ly fo l lows the Model Penal Code 
Consolidated Theft S ta tu te . Model Penal Code § 223 .1 . More than 
30 States have now adopted comprehensive consol idated t h e f t 
s t a t u t e s . Jjd. at n. 14. 
10 Often a prosecutor must plead a part icular theory of the f t 
prior to obtaining a l l the evidence that may be used a t t r i a l . A 
further d i f f i c u l t y i s that the appl icable the f t theory depends on 
what was in fac t the defendant's i n t e n t , a matter which the 
prosecutor can often only cuess . LaFave and Sco t t , Criminal Law. 
Ch. 8 , S 91 (4th ed . 1978) '. 
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Thus, under the Utah Theft S ta tu t e , "[a] 11 tha t i s now 
required i s to simply plead the general offense of thef t and the 
accusation may be supported by evidence tha t i t was committed in 
any manner specified in sect ions 404 through 410 of the Code." 
Sta te v. Taylor, 570 P.2d 697, 698 (Utah 1977); &££ a lso , JStaifi 
V- Seekfordf 638 P.2d 525, 526 (Utah 1982); S ta te v. Bai r , 671 
P.2d 203 (Utah 1983). I t i s no longer necessary to prove the 
elements of such theor ies as embezzlement or larceny by t r i ck as 
defendant suggests, but only those substantively defined in the 
thef t s t a t u t e . Xd. 
Defendant was charged by information with nine counts 
of thef t under the Consolidated Theft S ta tu te § 76-6-40411 (R. 
112-115). The Theft S ta tu te reads simply as follows: 
A person commits thef t if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive 
him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1953), as amended. This Court has 
s ta ted tha t in order to "sustain a conviction of the f t , the 
evidence must es tabl i sh the following elements beyond a 
1 1
 Defendant was o r ig ina l ly charged by information on October 7 , 
1983, in the Eighth Circui t Court of seven counts of theft by 
deception under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended (R. 
79-81). An Amended Information was l a t e r f i l ed on October 27, 
1983 charging 11 counts of general thef t under Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-6-404 (1953), as amended (R. 67-71). A Second Amended 
Information was f i l ed on September 10, 1984, charging nine counts 
of thef t under the same theft s t a t u t e , but modifying the alleged 
dates of the crimes to have occurred between the date each victim 
invested and April 29, 1980, when defendant had completely 
expended a l l the investors 1 money (R. 112-115). The Second 
Amended Information was f i l ed pursuant to leave of court as 
provided under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-4(a) (1953), as amended (R. 
7 1 , 111). Count IX of the Second Amended Information was l a t e r 
dismissed for lack of evidence (R. 190, 1115). 
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reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant obtained or exercised 
unlawful control over the property of another (2) with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof."12 State v. Davisr 680 P.2d 5 , 10 (Utah 
1984)• 
The first element of theft was established by witness 
testimony that the investors delivered money to defendant with 
the clear understanding that defendant would deposit the money in 
a trust account and use i t solely for the Temple Hills Project 
(R. 353, 366, 375, 376, 385, 392-4, 430, 436, 437, 460, 498, 
513). Defendant exercised unauthorized control over the 
investors' moneys when he deposited i t in his own non-trust 
operating account and used i t for speculative and unsecured 
ventures, unrelated to the Temple Hills Project (R. 118, 119, 
548-Jay Peterson Realty, 554-Dr. Jeffrey home, 560-shopping mall, 
575-6-West American Mining, 622-3-Sage Institute; J5££ ALSQF 
Appendix B. Accordingly, the investors testified that defendant 
was unauthorized to use their money for projects unrelated to the 
Temple Hills Project (R. 411, 499, 516). 
The second element of theft, defendant's purpose to 
deprive, was established by defendant's acts, conduct, and 
statements to the effect that he never intended to hold the 
investors' moneys in trust or use i t solely for the Temple Hills 
1Z
 In order for a theft conviction to be punishable as a second 
degree felony (as in all eight counts of this case), the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 must also be satisfied. 
These requirements were met in this case by the "stipulated 
facts" of the parties which referred to State's Exhibit #7 
indicating the amcunt each investor delivered to defendant was in 
excess of $l,000.t0 (R. 118, 1139-1140). 
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Project (R. 959, 968-9); S tate v. Davis . 687 P.2d 5, 12 (Utah 
1984) (allowing the second element of the f t to be es tabl i shed 
through inferences derived from a defendant's a c t s , conduct, and 
s tatements) . The f a c t that defendant t o t a l l y expended the 
i n v e s t o r s ' moneys for h i s own unauthorized purposes and f a i l e d t o 
return i t was s u f f i c i e n t to e s t a b l i s h defendant's purpose to 
deprive (R. 1304; Appendix B)• 
In t o t a l , the evidence a t t r i a l was more than 
s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h defendant's in tent ion t o exerc i se 
unauthorized control over the i n v e s t o r ' s money and to permanently 
deprive them thereof. The i ssue of defendant's g u i l t or 
innocence was properly submitted to the jury and upon 
de l iberat ion they concluded that defendant had committed the 
of fenses charged (R. 173-180) . Viewing the evidence and a l l 
inferences which may reasonably be drawn therefrom in the l i g h t 
most favorable to the v e r d i c t , State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161 
(Utah 1980) , t h i s Court should conclude that the evidence was 
s u f f i c i e n t to susta in defendant's convict ion on a l l counts. 
B. PROSECUTION WAS NOT TIME-BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Defendant a s s e r t s that prosecution was time barred by 
the s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s s ince , as he c laims, more than four 
years had elapsed between the time he committed the of fenses and 
the date the information was f i l e d (Appellant's Brief at p . 18 ) . 
Accordingly, defendant claims that the the f t o f fenses were 
complete when he took the inves tor s ' money rather than when he 









November 6, 1979 
August 27, 1979 
August 31, 1979 
August 31, 1979 
August 31, 1979 
November 6, 1979 
September 5, 1979 
August 31, 1979 
expended i t for h i s own purposes^ The fol lowing i s a l i s t of the 
inves tors 1 names, the date which they inves ted , and the 
corresponding count number in the Second Amended Information (R. 
112-115) . 
£aun£ Date of Investment Investor 
Jack Yalden 





Joe l Barlow 
Heber Pace 
1. THE OFFENSES CHARGED IN COUNTS I 
AND VI WERE COMMITTED WITHIN FOUR 
YEARS OF PROSECUTION. 
As noted e a r l i e r , the or ig ina l information was f i l e d on 
October 7 , 1983 charging defendant with the t h e f t s ar i s ing out of 
the Temple H i l l s Project scheme (R. 7 9 - 8 1 ) . The law requires 
that a prosecution for a felony be commenced within four years of 
the commission of the o f fense . Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302(1) 
(1953) , as amended. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in t h i s 
part, prosecutions for other of fenses are 
subject t o the fol lowing period of l i m i t a t i o n : 
13 At t r i a l , the prosecutor proceeded on an embezzlement theory 
a l l e g i n g the time of the offense t o have occurred when the 
defendant expended money from the operating account containing 
the Temple H i l l s Project funds (R. 197) . However, the case was 
submitted t o the jury on a s t ra ight the f t theory and the jury was 
not ins tructed on embezzlement. (£££, Jury I n s t r u c t i o n s , R. 143-
1 6 4 ) . In l i g h t of these circumstances and the prevai l ing case 
law on the subjec t , the State agrees that the time of each 
offense was when defendant took the inves tor s ' moneys, f a i l e d t o 
place i t in a t r u s t account, and put i t in h i s own operating 
account ever which he had s o l e contro l . State v. Gainer, 217 
Kan. 670 f 608 P.2d 968 (1980) (The crime of the f t i s not a 
continuing offense but i s complete at the time of t ak ing ) . 
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(a) A prosecution for a felony must be 
commenced within four years after i t i s 
committed. 
i d . A prosecution i s considered to be commenced upon the f i l i n g 
of an information charging the offense committed, s t a t e v. 
Strand. 674 P.2d 109 (Utah 1983) . A l a t e r amendment t o an 
information does not a f f e c t the t o l l i n g of the s ta tute of 
l i m i t a t i o n s . State v. Bi lby. 194 Kan. 600, 400 P.2d 1015 (1965) . 
Applying the s tatutory period of l i m i t a t i o n s to Counts I and VI, 
the the f t o f fenses committed on November 6, 1979 were not barred 
from prosecution when the information was f i l e d on October 7f 
1983 (R. 7 9 - 8 1 ) . Quick ari thmetic reveals that only 3 years, 11 
months had expired from the time the offense was committed to the 
time prosecution was commenced. Therefore, as t o Counts I and 
VI, defendant's argument that prosecution was barred by the 
s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s i s erroneous. 
2 . THE REMAINING SIX OFFENSES WERE NOT 
TIME BARRED BECAUSE THE STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS WAS EITHER TOLLED OR 
EXTENDED DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF FRAUD. 
The remaining s i x counts upon which defendant was 
convicted were not time barred from prosecution since they were 
commenced within the extended time period provided under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-303 (1953) , as amended. Section 303 provides 
the fo l lowing: 
If the period prescribed in subsect ion 
76-1-302(1) has expired, a prosecution may 
neverthe less be commenced for : 
(a) Any offense a material element of 
which i s e i ther JLtflild or a breach of f iduciary 
o b l i g a t i o n within one year after discovery of 
the offense by an aggrieved party or by a 
person who has a l e g a l duty to represent an 
aggrieved party and who i s himself not a party 
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to the offenser but in no case shall this 
provision extend the period of limitation 
otherwise applicable by more than three years; 
(emphasis added)• Thus, if a person is charged with an offense 
containing fraud as a material element, prosecution may be 
commenced within one year of discovery of the offense thereby 
extending the original period of limitations up to three years. 
As noted earlier, defendant was originally charged on 
October 7, 1983 with seven counts of theft by deception under 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended (R. 79-81). Since 
fraud is a material element of the offense of theft by deception 
the statute of limitations was extended under Section 303. Theft 
by deception is defined as follows: 
Theft by deception.—(1) A person commits 
theft if he obtains or exercises control over 
property of another by deception and with a 
purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, 
however, when there is only falsity as to 
matters having no pecuniary significance, or 
puffing by statements unlikely to deceive 
ordinary persons in the group addressed. 
"Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation 
of wares or worth in communications addressed 
to the public or to a class or group. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended. The fraud element 
requirement of Section 303 is present by the use of the term 
"deception." Deception is defined in the Code as follows: 
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person 
intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or 
conduct an impression of law or fact that is 
false and that the actor does not believe to 
be true and that is likely to affect the 
judgment of another in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a false impression 
of law or fact that the actor previously 
created or confirmed by words or conduct that 
is likely to affect the judgment of another 
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and that the actor does not now be l i eve to be 
true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring 
information l i k e l y to a f f e c t h i s judgment in 
the transact ion; or 
(d) S e l l s or otherwise transfers or 
encumbers property without d i s c lo s ing a l i e n , 
securi ty i n t e r e s t f adverse claim, or other 
l e g a l impediment to the enjoyment of the 
property, whether the l i e n , securi ty 
i n t e r e s t , claim, or impediment i s or i s not 
v a l i d or i s or i s not a matter of o f f i c i a l 
record; or 
(e) Promises performance that i s l i k e l y 
to a f f ec t the judgment of another in the 
transact ion , which performance the actor does 
not intend to perform or knows w i l l not be 
performed; provided, however, that f a i l u r e to 
perform the promise in i s sue without other 
evidence of intent or knowledge i s not 
s u f f i c i e n t proof that the actor did not 
intend t o perform or knew the promise would 
not be performed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5) (1953) , as amended. Thus, the fraud 
requirement of Sect ion 303 was s a t i s f i e d when defendant was 
charged with the f t by deception. 
Section 303 a l so requires that prosecution be commenced 
•within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved 
party or by a person who has a l ega l duty to represent an 
aggrieved party and who i s himself not a party to the offense . . 
." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303 (1953) , as amended. In the instant 
case , the Utah County Attorney's Office commenced an i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
and met with the defendant approximately ten days prior to October 
19 1983, the day the or ig inal information was f i l e d charging 
defendant with the t h e f t s ar i s ing out of the Temple H i l l s Project 
(R. 719) . There i s no evidence that an offense had been 
discovered by an aggrieved party or representat ive of the an 
aggrieved party prior to the i n v e s t i g a t i o n . In f a c t , the 
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circumstances show that defendant's fraudulent scheme had the 
e f f e c t of l u l l i n g the inves tors i n t o a s ta te of complacency 
designed t o conceal defendant's criminal a c t s . Under these 
circumstances, the s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s should be t o l l e d u n t i l 
discovery of the of fense . State v . Barberf 133 Ariz. 572 f 653 
P.2d 29 (Ariz. App. 1982) approved 133 Ariz . 549
 r 653 P.2d 6 
(Fraudulent scheme l u l l i n g v i c t ims i n t o s t a t e of complacency could 
c o n s t i t u t e s tar t ing po ints for s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s ) ; State v. 
Grauerholz. 232 Kan. 221 r 654 P.2d 395 (1982) (conduct evidencing 
design to conceal ongoing t h e f t s from funds held by executor t o l l s 
the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s ) . 
The Amended Information against defendant changing the 
charged of fenses from thef t by deception to general thef t did not 
a f f e c t the t o l l i n g of the s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s under Sect ion 
303. By modifying the charged o f fenses from thef t by deception 
under S 76-6-405 to general the f t under § 76-6 -404 , the 
prosecution merely broadened the scope of the charged of fenses to 
include a l l substant ive d e f i n i t i o n s contained in §§ 76-6-404-410, 
including thef t by deception. In f a c t , the evidence at t r i a l was 
s u f f i c i e n t t o submit the case to the jury on a the f t by deception 
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theory had the prosecutor chosen to do s o , 1 4 Therefore/ the fraud 
requirement of S 76-1-303 remained s a t i s f i ed . 
Further, the fact t h a t defendant was convicted of thef t 
without a required finding of fraud i s immaterial to the t o l l i ng 
effect on the s t a tu t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . S 76-1-303 merely requires 
that prosecution be commenced under an offense containing fraud as 
a mater ial element not tha t the prosecution must r e su l t in a 
conviction on the substantive def in i t ion of the offense containing 
fraud. Utah Code Ann. S 76-1-303 (1953), as amended. The 
consolidated theft s t a tu te c rea tes a unique circumstance where a 
defendant may be charged with the offense of thef t which may be 
proved by evidence supporting any one of i t s substantive 
de f in i t i ons , one of which contains fraud as a material element. 
Cer ta inly , the prosecutor was not intending to circumvent the 
s t a t u t e of l imi t a t ions by modifying the charges from thef t by 
deception to general t he f t . In a l l l ikel ihood the prosecutor was 
unaware of the fraud extension to the s t a tu t e of l imi t a t ions t ha t 
was avai lable under § 76-1-3 03. Thus, where a prosecution has 
commenced upon the prosecutor ' s reasonable belief tha t a theft by 
deception has occurred, and the prosecution l a t e r modifies the 
1 4
 The difference between thef t and thef t by deception i s t ha t 
thef t requires a person to obtain or exercise "unauthorized 
control " where thef t by deception requires a person to obtain or 
exercise control "by deception". See, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
and 405 (1953), as amended. The element of deception was proven 
by the investors 1 testimony that defendant induced them to invest 
by his promise to deposit t he i r money into a t r u s t account and 
use i t solely for the Temple H i l l s Project (R. 353, 366, 375, 
376, 385, 392-4, 430, 436, 437, 460, 498, 513). Defendant's 
testimony tha t he never had the in tent ion of so doing was 
suff ic ient t o es tab l i sh deception und»r the def in i t ion provided 
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5)(e) ( l i 53 ) , as amended. 
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charges t o general t h e f t , the s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s should be 
extended pursuant to Sect ion 3 03 where the or ig ina l period of 
l i m i t a t i o n s has e lapsed. Further, s u f f i c i e n t evidence of fraud 
was introduced a t t r i a l (R. 118, 119, 353 , 366, 375, 376, 385, 
392-94 , 430, 5 4 8 ) . 
In the event that t h i s Court determines that Counts I I , 
I I I , IV, V, VII , and VIII of the Second Amended Information were 
time barred, t h i s Court should uphold defendant's convic t ions on 
Counts I and VI. Presumably, defendant could a s s e r t that he was 
prejudiced by the evidence of other of fenses which were 
s t a t u t o r i l y barred from prosecution. 
Rule 404 (b ) , Utah R. Evid . , Vol. 9B, Utah Code Ann. 
(Supp. 1977) provides: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or a c t s . Evidence 
of other crimes, wrongs or a c t s i s not admissible 
to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith. I t 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, i n t e n t , 
preparation, plan, knowledge, i d e n t i t y , or 
absence of mistake or acc ident . 
However, i t i s a wel l accepted rule that "While evidence of other 
bad a c t s i s inadmiss ible to show the general d i s p o s i t i o n of the 
defendant, such evidence, when relevant and competent, i s 
admiss ible to prove a material f a c t . State v. Shaffer , 36 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 28 (June 25 , 1986) c i t i n g State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 
546 (Utah 1983) . 
Further, testimony of other inves tors would be 
admissible as i t would "reveal subs tant ia l relevant 
misrepresentat ions made by the defendant in perpetrat ion of a 
common plan or scheme." S t a t e y. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 
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1982) . £&£ ALEQ State Vt Piercer Utah, No. 20943, s l i p op. at 2 
(July 17, 1986). In the present case a l l of the of fenses arose 
from the same scheme and were i n t e g r a l l y related in time, method 
and persons involved. The inves tors 1 testimony was offered to 
e s t a b l i s h the fact that defendant had represented that he would 
hold the i r money in t rus t and use i t s o l e l y for the Temple H i l l s 
Project (R. 353, 366, 375, 376, 385, 392-4 , 430, 436, 437, 460, 
498, 513).15 Therefore, i t would not have been prejudic ia l error 
for the t r i a l court t o admit evidence of defendant's 
representat ions to inves tors whose ac t ions may have been barred by 
the s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s but whose testimony was offered t o show 
a common plan or scheme. S&S S tate v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 
(Utah 1982) . 
C. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
ESTABLISH THAT PROSECUTION WAS 
COMMENCED WITHIN THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS. 
As discussed in Point IA of t h i s brief , prosecution was 
commenced within 4 years of the commission of the offenses in 
Counts I and VI of the Second Amended Information and a l s o within 
the extended statutory time l i m i t a t i o n on the remaining counts. 
The evidence at t r i a l was s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h the actual dates 
that defendant obtained control over the inves tors 1 moneys and 
deposited them in h i s personal operating account. (JS££, 
Appellants1 Brief at p. 4; Appendix B). Applying the s ta tute of 
15 Three inves tors not named in the information were permitted t o 
t e s t i f y concerning defendant's representat ions t o them that the ir 
money would be held in t rus t and used for the Temple H i l l s 
Project only (R. 483-92) . Defendant does not dispute the 
admissabi l i ty of the ir testimony. 
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limitations to the dates established at trial, the evidence was 
sufficient to prove that prosecution was commenced within the 
allowable time period. Utah Code Ann. SS 76-1-302 through 303 
(1953), as amended. 
POINT II 
THE JURY VERDICT WAS PROPER REGARDING 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Defendant a s s e r t s that the jury verd ic t was improper 
s ince i t a l l eged a range of dates for each count, some of which 
were outs ide of the or ig ina l s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s (R. 112-115, 
173-180) . Defendant ignores , however, the extension t o the 
s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s provided under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303(a) 
(1953), as amended, which e f f e c t i v e l y enlarged the s tatutory time 
period t o include a l l dates charged on the information. 
Defendant was o r i g i n a l l y charged on October 7, 1983. 
Assuming, as defendant argues, the jury found defendant committed 
the t h e f t s on April 27, 1979, the of fenses would s t i l l have been 
wi th in the s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s s ince Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303 
(1953) , as amended extends the s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s . JL££ 
argument I, supra. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT 
AND/OR SUPPORT HIS CLAIM WITH ANY RECORD 
EVIDENCE SHOULD PRECLUDE THIS COURT1S 
REVIEW OF WHETHER IT WAS ERROR FOR THE 
TRIAL COURT TO PROCEED WITH A NEW TRIAL 
MOTION HEARING WITHOUT AN ADEQUATE RECORD. 
Defendant contends that the t r i a l court committed error 
by holding a hearing on defendant's new t r i a l motion before new 
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counsel had obtained an adequate transcript of the t r i a l * * 6 While 
defendant maintains that an adequate t r i a l transcr ipt was 
necessary for new counse l ' s preparation, he admits "that many of 
the matters intended to be raised on the motion were matters 
outs ide the record, going to t r i a l counse l ' s overa l l 
i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s . " (Appellant's Brief at p. 26) . 
New counsel argued four separate grounds in support of 
h i s motion for new t r i a l : f i r s t , that there was evidence known to 
defense counsel at the time of t r i a l which had not been presented; 
second, that the introduct ion i n t o evidence of defendant's 
conversations with h i s counsel was error ;*? th ird , that there was 
i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence to j u s t i f y the v e r d i c t ; and fourth, that 
some of the wi tnesses were not t o t a l l y candid with the court (R. 
1131-32)• The t r i a l court denied defendant's motion s ta t ing that 
there was s u f f i c i e n t evidence to submit the quest ion of 
defendant's g u i l t to the jury and that i t was simply t r i a l 
s trategy for defense counsel not to offer evidence which he had 
16 Judgment was entered on the jury verdict on October 26, 1984 
(R. 1983-4) . Trial counsel withdrew from representat ion on 
November 2 , 1984 and new counsel entered h i s appearance on 
November 5 , 1984 along with a Motion for New Trial and a Motion 
for Additional Time to Submit Memorandum (R. 195, 197-201, 203 ) . 
Oral arguments on defendant's motion for new t r i a l were held on 
January 1 1 , 1985 (R. 1129-1134) . There i s no record evidence to 
the e f f e c t that new counsel did not have access to the t r i a l 
t ranscr ip t s before oral arguments. In f a c t , the record contains 
a statement by the court reporter that the requested t ranscr ip t s 
would be ava i lab le to new counsel by the f i r s t part of January, 
1985 (R. 206) . 
1<7
 Apparently t h i s argument was in reference to Mr. Sandgren's 
testimony of conversations he had had with defendant regarding 
the Earnest Money Agreement, Based upon t h i s i s s u e , defendant 
obtained a Cer t i f i ca t e of Probable Cause and stay pendiig appeal 
(R. 207-210) . Defendant does not ra ise t h i s i ssue on appeal. 
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knowledge of at t r i a l (R. 1133) . ££fi, Utah R. Civ. P. 59 (a ) ; 
Gergerson x^JJenzen, 617 P.2d 369, 372 (Utah 1980) ( s e t t i n g out 
c r i t e r i a t o be met before new tr ied i s awarded on grounds of newly 
discovered evidence)• 
Defendant does not dispute the grounds for the t r i a l 
c o u r t ' s ru l ing , ins tead , he a l l e g e s that the court committed error 
in proceeding upon the new t r i a l motion without al lowing new 
counsel time to prepare an adequate record. However, defendant 
f a i l s t o support h i s claim with any reference t o the record 
showing that the t r i a l court ac tua l l y denied a request for 
continuance or that new counsel objected t o proceeding on the new 
t r i a l motion without more time to prepare . 1 8 In the absence of 
any record evidence in support of defendant's claim or a showing 
of contemporaneous object ion by defendant in the t r i a l court 
below, t h i s Court should not consider rul ing on the matter. £ta±£ 
v. Steggel lp 660 P.2d 252 (Utah 1983) (the Court w i l l not consider 
i s sues ra ised for the f i r s t time on appeal where no t imely and 
proper objec t ion was made in the t r i a l cour t ) ; S ta te v. Olmos# 712 
P.2d 287 (Utah 1986) (by f a i l i n g t o refer to pages in the record 
to support claim on appeal, Court w i l l normally assume regular i ty 
in the proceedings and correctness of the judgment below). 
Even assuming i t was error for the t r i a l court to 
proceed with a hearing on the motion for new t r i a l without an 
adequate record, such error would have been harmless s ince there 
1 8
 Only two references t o the record appear in t h i s port ion of 
defendant's br ie f (Brief of Appellant at p. 27) . Neither of 
those references support a factual' a l l e g a t i o n pert inent t o 
defendant's claim. 
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was no reasonable l ike l ihood of a more favorable r e s u l t for 
defendant had an adequate record been provided. £&£ State v. 
Fontana. 680 P.2d 1042, 1048 (Utah 1984) . New counsel 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y presented the grounds for a new t r i a l motion, most 
of which were matters outs ide of the record (R. 1131-2; 
Appel lant ' s Brief at p . 26) . In l i g h t of these circumstances, any 
error that may have been committed by the t r i a l court should be 
considered harmless. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT. 
Defendant a l l e g e s the t r i a l court erred in ordering 
defendant t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y defendant claims 
r e s t i t u t i o n was improper because: (1) the t r i a l court ordered 
r e s t i t u t i o n without inquiring i n t o defendant's a b i l i t y to pay 
r e s t i t u t i o n ; (2) the t r i a l court did not make i t s reasons for 
ordering r e s t i t u t i o n part of i t s wr i t t en order nor did the court 
ind ica te i t followed the c r i t e r i a spec i f i ed by law, Utah Code Ann. 
S 76 -3 -201(3 ) ; (3) the r e s t i t u t i o n ordered by the court 
contemplates r e s t i t u t i o n to a l l eged v ic t ims of of fenses for which 
the defendant was neither charged nor convicted nor admitted h i s 
g u i l t in v i o l a t i o n of Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(3) (a) ; (4) the 
manner of enforcement for defendant's f a i l u r e to pay r e s t i t u t i o n 
i s unclear from the cour t ' s order. 
The sentencing s t a t u t e provides: 
Sentences or combination of sentences 
al lowed—Civi l pena l t i e s—Res t i tu t ion— 
Definit ions—Aggravation cr mi t igat ion of 
crimes with mandatory sentences . (1) Within 
the l i m i t s prescribed by t h i s chapter, a 
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court may sentence a person adjudged g u i l t y 
of an offense t o any one of the fo l lowing 
sentences or combination of such sentences: 
(a) to pay a f i n e ; or 
(b) to removal from and/or d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n 
of public or private o f f i c e ; or 
(c) t o probation unless otherwise 
s p e c i f i c a l l y provided by law; or 
(d) t o imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1984). Additionally, Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-3-201(3) (Supp. 1984) reads: 
(3) (a) When a person is adjudged guilty 
of criminal activity which has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other 
sentence it may impose, the court shall order 
that the defendant make restitution up to 
double the amount of pecuniary damages to the 
victim or victims of the offense of which the 
defendant has pleaded guilty, is convicted, 
or to the victim of any other criminal conduct 
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
court unless the court in applying the criteria 
in Subsection (b) finds that restitution is 
inappropriate. If the court determines that 
restitution is appropriate or inappropriate, the 
court shall make the reasons for the decision a 
part of its written order. 
(b) In determining whether or not to order 
restitution, or restitution which is complete, 
partial, or nominal, the court shall take into 
account: 
(i) The financial resources of the defendant 
and the burden that payment of restitution will 
impose, with due regard to the other obligations 
of the defendant; 
(ii) The ability of the defendant to pay 
restitution on an installment basis or on other 
conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) The rehabilitative effect on the 
defendant of the payment of restitution and 
the method of payment; and 
(iv) Other circumstances which in the 
opinion of the court shall make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(c) If the defendant objects to the 
imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of 
sentencing alio/ him a full hearing on such 
issue. 
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The statutory language i s c lear that a court may sentence a 
defendant to any combination of p e n a l t i e s within the l i m i t s of the 
s t a t u t e . JLd. 
Defendant a l l e g e s he advised the t r i a l court a t the 
sentencing he could not repay the buyers* In f a c t , j u s t the 
opposi te i s true* At the sentencing hearing, defendant asserted 
that he should not be incarcerated so that he might have the 
opportunity t o gain a s s e t s and repay the investors (R. 1122-3) . 
Although the t r i a l court may not have s p e c i f i c a l l y 
inquired i n t o d e f e n d a n t s a b i l i t y t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n , the record 
as a whole af f irmative ly e s t a b l i s h e s that r e s t i t u t i o n was 
appropriate. The f a c t s were s t ipu la ted that defendant was 
responsible for pecuniary damages to the Temple H i l l s inves tors in 
the amount of $566,600.00 (R. 1 1 8 - 9 ) . The evidence revealed that 
defendant had maintained a substant ia l net worth cons i s t ing of a 
var ie ty of a s s e t s (R. 554 ) , home purchased from Dr. Jeffrey (R. 
566), one-third partnership i n t e r e s t in shopping mall venture (R. 
577) , one-fourth i n t e r e s t in West American Mining (R. 591) , 
property claim on mining equipment (R. 709) , Universi ty S tree t 
property (R. 897) , employed as consultant for Tel-America a t time 
of t r i a l (R. 948) , depos i t s of $334,000 in 1980 unrelated t o 
Temple H i l l s (R. 1002) , net worth of $200,000 in 1979. 
Defendant claims t h i s Court has disfavored "fines and 
r e s t i t u t i o n for defendants who lack the a b i l i t y to pay" and r e l i e s 
upon the d i s sen t in State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1222 (Utah 
1984) (Stewart, J. and Durham, J. d i s s e n t i n g ) . In Peterson the 
defendant claimed a $10,000 f ine was e x c e s s i v e . This Court in 
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fact affirmed the fine and s ta ted t h a t "the matter of the sentence 
r e s t s e n t i r e l y within the d i sc re t ion of the Courtf within the 
l i m i t s prescribed by law" I d . a t 1219 c i t i ng S ta te v. Har r i s , 585 
P.2d 450 (Utah 1985). In Peterson f as in the present case, the 
t r ia l court fa i led t o inquire in to defendant 's a b i l i t y to pay. 
S ta te v, Petersop, 681 P.2d a t 1222. Defendant's re l iance upon 
Peterson i s misplaced since the majority c lea r ly found the fine 
was appropriate although the court fa i led to inquire in to 
defendant 's a b i l i t y to pay the f ine . 
In the ins tan t case, the amount of the r e s t i t u t i o n and 
the means of payment were not decided by the t r i a l court , but 
ra ther l e f t to be determined through agreement between defendant 
and the Division of Corrections or through c iv i l l i t i g a t i o n (R. 
212). The t r i a l judge merely l imi ted the amount of r e s t i t u t i o n to 
"no more than $500,000.00." Xd. Thus, defendant i s premature in 
his claimed lack of a b i l i t y to pay when no spec i f ic amount of 
r e s t i t u t i o n has ye t been determined. 
Defendant next argues the t r i a l court erred in " fa i l ing 
to make i t s f inding" for r e s t i t u t i o n par t of a wr i t t en order. 
Admittedly, the t r i a l court in the ins tan t case fa i led to comply 
with the mandatory language in the s t a t u t e which requires the 
court t o make the reasons for i t s decision to order r e s t i t u t i o n "a 
pa r t of i t s wr i t t en order ." (R. 211-212); Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
201(a) (Supp. 1984). However, the t r i a l c o u r t ' s omission does not 
under the circumstances r i s e to the level of pre judic ia l error 
tha t would j u s t i fy a remand for determination of sentencing. 
Recently, t h i s Court ruled in S ta te v. Slayer. 706 P.2d 611 (Utah 
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1985) that although an order does not r e f l e c t the reasons for a 
t r i a l court ' s dec i s ion to order r e s t i t u t i o n i f ample record 
evidence e x i s t s from which the tr ied court could have found 
r e s t i t u t i o n was proper, f a i l u r e to comply with the s ta tu te i s 
harmless error . 
In the instant case , the record contains s u f f i c i e n t 
evidence that r e s t i t u t i o n was appropriate. Defendant had 
maintained a substant ial net worth of a var ie ty of a s s e t s (R. 554, 
566, 577, 591, 94 8 ) . Further, the defendant was employed as a 
consultant a t Tel-America a t the time of t r i a l (R. 897) . 
Defendant next a l l e g e s the t r i a l court improperly 
provided r e s t i t u t i o n for v ic t ims of offenses for which defendant 
was neither charged nor convicted. The t r i a l cour t ' s sentencing 
order provides in part: 
2 . The Defendant i s ordered t o pay a 
f ine of $1,000 on each of the e ight counts 
for which he was convicted in these proceedings. 
3 . The Defendant i s ordered to make 
r e s t i t u t i o n t o the ind iv idua l s who invested 
money in the Temple H i l l s condominium project . 
The amount of r e s t i t u t i o n shal l be determined 
by: a) agreement between the Defendant and 
the Div i s ion of Corrections, b) as determined 
through c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n , or c) by further 
order of the Court. The amount of r e s t i t u t i o n 
shal l not exceed $500,000.00. 
While the c o u r t ' s language in i t s sentencing order may be 
interpreted broadly regarding which inves tors are to be repaid, i t 
must be assumed that the court only contemplated those v ic t ims 
e n t i t l e d to r e s t i t u t i o n under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(3) (Supp. 
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1984).19 
Thus, defendant should be required to make restitution 
only to those victims of the offenses of which he was convicted; 
namely. Jack Yalden, Arben and Barbara Jolley, David Smith, Joel 
Barlow, and Heber Pace (R. 112-115)j Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(3) 
(Supp. 1984). 
Finally, defendant alleges the manner of enforcement 
for his failure to pay restitution is unclear. Specifically, 
defendant asserts that his potential failure to pay restitution 
may result in indefinite imprisonment for debt.20 The Legislature 
has specifically addressed this issue and has provided safeguards 
to protect a defendant's rights. 
Nonpayment of fine or restitution as 
contempt—Imprisonment—Relief where default 
not contenpt—Collection of Default* (1) When 
a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or to make 
restitution defaults in the payment thereof or 
of any installment, the court on motion of the 
county attorney, victim, or upon its own motion 
may require him to show cause why his default 
should not be treated as contempt of court, and 
may issue a show cause citation or a warrant of 
arrest for his appearance. 
(2) Unless the defendant shows that his 
default was not attributable to an intentional 
refusal to obey the order of the court or to a 
failure on his part to make a good faith effort 
to make the payment, the court may find that his 
default constitutes contempt and may order him 
committed until the fine or the restitution, or a 
specified part thereof, is paid. . • • 
19 "victims11 for purposes of restitution are limited to those 
"victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded 
guilty, is convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal 
conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court • • 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(3) (Supp. 1984). 
20
 Utah Const. Art I, S 16 provides that "Thsre shall be no 
imprisonment for debt. • • •" 
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(3) When a f ine or an order of r e s t i t u t i o n 
i s imposed on a corporation or unincorporated 
a s soc ia t i on , i t i s the duty of the person authorized 
t o make disbursement from the a s s e t s of the 
corporation or a s soc ia t ion t o pay the f ine or 
make the r e s t i t u t i o n form those a s s e t s , and h i s 
f a i l u r e to do so may be held t o be contempt unless 
he makes the showing required in subsect ion (2) 
of t h i s s ec t i on . 
(4) The term of imprisonment for contempt 
for nonpayment of f i n e s or f a i l u r e to make 
r e s t i t u t i o n sha l l be s e t forth in the commitment 
order. 
(5) If i t appears t o the s a t i s f a c t i o n of 
the court that the defaul t in the payment of a 
f ine or r e s t i t u t i o n i s not contempt, the court 
may enter an order allowing the defendant 
addit ional time for payment, reducing the 
amount thereof or of each instal lment or 
revoking the f ine or order of r e s t i t u t i o n or 
the unpaid portion thereof in whole or in part. 
A defaul t in the payment of a f ine or c o s t s 
or f a i l u r e to make r e s t i t u t i o n or any instal lment 
thereof may be c o l l e c t e d by any means authorized 
by law for the enforcement of a judgment. The 
county attorney may c o l l e c t r e s t i t u t i o n in behalf 
of a v ic t im. The levy of execution for the 
c o l l e c t i o n of a f ine or r e s t i t u t i o n sha l l not 
discharge a defendant committed t o imprisonment 
for contempt unt i l the amount of the f ine or 
r e s t i t u t i o n has ac tua l ly been c o l l e c t e d . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201.1 (Supp. 1983) . While t h i s court has 
recognized l i m i t a t i o n s on a court ' s power to impose a penalty for 
contempt, 21 i t has a l s o been acknowledged that "one who stands on 
"wi l l fu l defiance or disobedience" of a proper court order may be 
punished by imprisonment." Thomas v. Thomasy 569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 
1977) . Thomas s e t s forth three c r i t e r i a to be met in order to 
j u s t i f y imprisonment for contempt: (1) that "the party knew what 
was required of himj (2) that he had the a b i l i t y to comply; and 
(3) tha t he w i l f u l l y and knowingly f a i l e d and refused t o do so ." 
2 1
 Harris v . Harris , 14 Utah 2d 96 , 377 P.2d 1007 (1963) (Cited 
by defendant) . 
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Xd* at 1121. These concerns have been incorporated i n t o the 
s t a t u t e regarding nonpayment of f i n e s and f o r f e i t u r e s and are in 
conformity with cons t i tu t iona l safeguards against imprisonment for 
mere debt . JBjdaLtuLfiai^lAtiire .Survey # 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155, 192. 
In any event, t h i s Court should not consider 
defendant's c o n s t i t u t i o n a l claims of imprisonment for debt when no 
such occurrence has transpired or been threatened. I t i s a 
fundamental pr inc ip le of law that "before a party may attack the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of a s t a t u t e he must be adversely af fected by 
that very s t a t u t e . " Sims v- Smith, 571 P.2d 586 (Utah 1977) . 
There i s no evidence contained in the record t o show that 
defendant has been or i s about to be prejudiced by the contempt 
s t a t u t e . Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201.1 (Supp. 1983) . In the 
absence of that evidence, defendant lacks the a b i l i t y t o 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y chal lenge the s t a t u t e . 
F i n a l l y , i t would be premature for the t r i a l court to 
order a manner of enforcement for defendant's f a i l u r e to pay 
r e s t i t u t i o n prior to a f inding that defendant i n t e n t i o n a l l y 
refused t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n or f a i l e d t o make a good f a i t h e f f o r t 
to pay r e s t i t u t i o n as per Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 .1 (Supp. 
1983) . Had the t r i a l court ordered defendant t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n 
forthwith or spend a s p e c i f i e d number of days in j a i l , that 
c l e a r l y would have been uncons t i tu t iona l . Frazier v . Jordanf 457 
F.2d 726 (5th Cir . 1972) . S££ 3lS£> BeaideJL-Xjt-GeSK&laf 461 U.S. 
660 (1983) . 
In sum, the t r i a l c o u r t ' s sentencing order was proper 
where the law provided that a person convicted of a second degree 
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felony may be sentenced t o pay a f ine not exceeding $10,000.00, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-301(1) (1953), as amended, and may be 
ordered t o pay r e s t i t u t i o n up t o double the amount of the 
pecuniary damages suffered by h i s v i c t i m s . Utah Code Ann. § 76 -3 -
201(3) (Supp. 1984) . In l i g h t of circumstances of the crimes, the 
f a c t s contained in the record, and the f indings of the t r i a l 
court , i t i s improbable that on remand defendant would receive a 
more favorable sentence. 
£DJ3£LS£IQB 
Based upon the foregoing, the s t a t e requests t h i s Court 
t o f ind s u f f i c i e n t evidence e x i s t e d that defendant committed the 
charged of fenses and the charges were brought within the s ta tute 
of l i m i t a t i o n s . The jury verd ic t regarding the f t was proper s ince 
the jury could find the the f t had been committed within the 
s ta tu te of l i m i t a t i o n s . The t r i a l court did not abuse i t s 
d i s c r e t i o n in denying defendant's motion for a new t r i a l . 
F ina l ly , the r e s t i t u t i o n order was supported by f a c t s within the 
record and further was an appropriate sentence. Respondent 
r e s p e c t f u l l y requests the jury verd ic t and the sentencing order 
should be affirmed. 
DATED t h i s fi2lL_ day of July , 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Ass i s tant Attorney General 
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APPENDIX A 
(STATE'S EXHIBIT #20—EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT) 
CVAlANT!COMfANT 
SALT LAKE CITY. VTAM J l t O U • MOVO. UTAH JT7+IM • OGDtN. UTAH SlI-SOlO 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE 
Thift miy W ft legally finding form. If not unrfrrituod »*rk other •dvirt 
%• FHJLLIP SKYDCT REALTY BRDVO 
V 
TI.I.S rONnOMINIUMS UNIT t tCu.1^^ fr>**iT_ f f< < 1 _ 
* ^ & / T - i T 
jnwL 
M — WOHE 
JffAH_. 






1. Buyer understands and agrees that this earnest money deposit is non-refundable. 
it ?. Seller agrees to discount the normal purchase price of % fjbr tSOC*-*- by (£ ^ t / ^ 
it to an effective total purchase price of %£j<^PpO **^~ • as shown hereon. ' "_ 
% - - - - - - - - - - - - .. -
it 
1. Buyer understands that this Is a limited pre-construction sales offer,
 — 
4. Buyer shall have the right to select a different condominium unit style or lorat ion in_ 
the project at the same or a different purchase price, provided such change in Wade 
prior to 7 T ^ j 0 i 
g. Seller agrees to proceed with obtaining final plans, specifications and begin actual 
construction in a timely, effecient manner as soon as possible. 
t« 6. It is anticipated that final completion and possession of all units should occur no 
•» later than August 31, 1981, with some first units possibly being completed tun h pooncr. 
9 9 m^mm *m • m m» * S e e A b O V tofitiw - m »•«•»•« H »**. »»*••—. M ——>. to* Mr« ot •* —"~. m o»r •*••. •»•» 0*» »»i»«u •• »kr»M t« MM J - - | W 
l * * M r *»»'i»»|» •» «*M«art fry ! * • • M W tar^* M*»«w«: MM»*wt M _ _ W / A 
K M l l M M t • !•*•« Mr«»«ti #^ »*•* tet-> M #• •«»• t p«**%*tw* «Mtfi •«•• »••«•» to(*»« S e e A b o v e 
»« » AM •»*•» w*«* *<N 
Wo Except ions 
k C*«*tr»cl • * S«t« •» K»ili«m«nt * f coA»«y»nct to fr« madt »n I N •ppro««0 form •» trt* Ul«r« 0*pt. of Smiimt (UfuUtiOA In | M M M »f 
. • . • . * ' . . ' • •» • ' • • • — • — • • • • • - . t i 
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7. Seller shall not be responsible for delays caused by events beyond his cont*< 
labor strikes, material shortages, flood, fire, stc. 
B. This agreement shall be replaced with (1) final plans, (2) specifications, aiM (3) con-
struction a'greenent signed by both Buyer and Seller. 
f. It is understood and agreed that should Buyer elect no to occupy the unit(s) |ni| 
choose to sell, said sale(s) are to be transacted through Seller's real estst* 
company on a six (6) percent fee besisi**- **•-* 
10. Xn the event that the Seller defaults, for any reason, and the project cannot W 
cosqpleted, all monies previously deposited by Buyer will be returned in full, }«l\tp 
10% annual interest. 
XX. Xf Buyer sleets not to occupy said unit, be will authorise Seller to sell unit 
and Seller guarantees that Buyer will receive his initial investment plus an i M i H ^ l 
amount eqfuaj to said original investment. 
APPENDIX B 
(STATE'S EXHIBIT #47—DEFENDANT'S OPERATING ACCOUNT) 
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APPENDIX C 
(STATE'S EXHIBIT #7—LIST OF INVESTORS IN TEMPLE 
HILLS CONDOMINIUM PROJECT) 
3B5ELE BILLS CDHDOttlNIffl 2BDJECL 
Joel C. Barlow 
Frances P. Barlow 
Gerald E. Browning 
Martha B. Brcuning 
Norman li. Carlson 
Ruth Carlson 
Walter L. Ekins 
Martha Jean Ekins 
Joseph C Eyring 
Lavon Eyring 
Uoyd D. Budraan 
Claire A. Budoan 
j . Arben Jolley 
Barbara K. Jolley 
Adrian D. Nelson 
June Nelson 
Bebcr J . face 
Dara C Pace 
Robert I?. Petty 
Nadalou Petty 
G. David Smith 
Drusa D. Snith 
Robert J . Sunderland 
Marjoric Sunderland 
Ray i:. l id ton 
Elaine P. Walton 
Jack G. Yalden 
Borrora K. Yalden 
1235 Cedar Ave. 
Provo, Utah 84601 
2115 Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84601 
35 West 800 North 
Orem, Utah 84057 
c/o 2115 Canyon Rd. 
Provo,. Utah 
4123 N. Dover Lane 
Provo, Utah 84601 
1050 East 700 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Vernal, Utah 
930 N. 2050 W. 
1098 East 600 North 
Orem, Utah 84057 
2725 North 600 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Saudi Arabia 
3708 North 700 East 
Provo, Utah 84604 
2240 North 300 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
635 South 850 East 
















































509 Fern Drive 
Clearfield, Utah 
1452 Sorrer Road 
Boulder City, Nevada 
1646 Birch 
Solvang, California 







2425 Crestview Estates Place (619)747-8887 
Escondido, California 92027 
P.O. Box 606 
Parker, Colorado 
(303)841-0348 
8784 Grand Oak Drive 262-7734 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
95 East*600 North 
Nephi, Utah 84648 




1408 Pitman Avenue (415)322-3305 
Palo Alto, California 94301 
50C0 Moonstone Court 
San Jose, California 
3546 Gateway Road 
















Barlw.n Kickelprang 8784 Grand Oak Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 262-7734 5,000 
$566,600.00 
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